01
The grant is user-shaped, not data-shaped
Finding
When somebody connects an assistant to their mailbox or their drive, what do they actually grant it? We read four vendors' own documentation and the answer is consistent: the unit of restriction is the application, never the data. The narrowest mail scope that can read a message reads every message. The default file corpus is, in the publisher's own words, files owned by or shared to the user. And in four places a vendor's own marketing and their own scope list disagree with each other.
12 September 20264 sources, quoted verbatimNothing tested
02
What buying a behaviour policy would actually look like
Mockup
Twelve stages from the first question a stranger reads to a delivered, recomputing vault with a read key they can hand to an underwriter. Five of those stages are drawn here as interface mockups, including the one that matters most: what a draft policy looks like, and what correcting it feels like. None of this is built. The mockups exist so the flow can be argued with before it is written.
12 September 20265 screensNot built
03
Changes we are asking of the behaviour-policy site
Proposal
The model and its data live on a separate site, maintained by somebody else. This is our open request list against it: one new property for the capability grammar, four deployment shapes we would like published, and the provenance conventions we would need in order to render any of it. Published rather than emailed, so the reasoning is checkable and the answer can be public too.
12 September 20263 requestsAwaiting a reply
04
Seven things to build, and one word we have not earned
Proposal
The build specification for the first thing anybody will ever use: a page that asks what you run, computes what you granted, and hands you the gap. Three tools, two vaults, two documents — and the arithmetic that decides what may leave the browser. A twenty-connector multi-select carries about 20 bits, which is more entropy than a well-known browser-fingerprint study measured in a whole fingerprint, so the full shape is computed locally and only bands and categories are ever submitted.
12 September 20267 things to createNothing built
05
Your agent can commit as you, and no instruction stops it
Finding
The author name and address on a commit are free text — git's own reference says the name has no effect on authentication, the code host's write interface takes both as parameters needing only contents write, and the host attributes the result to whoever owns that address with no consent step and no notification. Exactly one thing prevents it, and it is a repository setting. Alongside the finding: the eight-line prompt we would ship, with every line marked by what actually enforces it, and six documented incidents whose fixes have one thing in common.
12 September 20266 sources checked verbatimNothing tested
06
Every routable address is in the grant, and the one rule everybody signs has no barrier
Finding
Ask any deployer whether their agent should attack other people's systems and you get the same answer — it is the easiest line in any policy to agree. It is also the one where the grant cannot be enumerated at all: it is every address the process can route to, nobody granted it, and the measure we have been using since Lab 04 does not apply. A vendor's own documentation says the fetch allow list does not prevent network access because the shell can reach any URL; the setting that does hold covers shell subprocesses only, does nothing when written into a repository, and fails open. Includes what the machine that published this page can reach, measured.
12 September 20267 sources checked verbatimOne measurement of our own
07
What you are actually buying: the vault, delivered
Proposal
The first behaviour-policy vault, built and pushed rather than drawn. Eight files derived from three inputs — a measured grant, a starting mandate and a pinned vocabulary — for Claude Code on the web with one repository attached. The delta is recomputed and checked against the published record; a Licence to Operate gets a referent; two generic files tell the agent what the others are and, in their own words, what a file like that cannot do. The session that built it read the grant back against what it had actually done, and the template makes the second shape one command.
15 September 2026Built from abp.sgit.ai v0.3.0One vault pushed