Everything on this page follows from one observation: by the time a request is made, authorisation has already happened. That means the answer can be computed from a model of what exists — which is why nothing we run has to sit between an agent and what it is doing.
Not a decision made at request time. Authority was conferred the moment capability was — and what an agent can actually do is the union of every route to that capability, not the subset someone wrote down.
The privilege issued
granted, and documented
The credential discovered
found on a filesystem
The adjacent system reached
via a trusted path
The account recovered
through a reset flow
The agent that dropped the database was, by this definition, already authorised to drop it. Calling that a breach of policy describes the paperwork, not the system.
Make the union visible, bound it deliberately, and accept what's left for a stated interval with a named owner. That's the whole product.
This is also why we never need to sit in the request path — authorisation already happened.
We model the primitives that matter — capabilities, assets, flows — rather than wiring into every system underneath. Nothing we run sits between an agent and what it's doing.
Twins model capabilities, assets and flows, so coverage doesn't require a connector for every system an agent touches.
No runtime decisions and no enforcement point. There is nothing in line that can slow an agent down or break it — which makes the security review a much shorter conversation.
Signals are consumed to find where our model of your agents is wrong — not to police traffic. Observed behaviour is how conferred capability gets reverse-engineered.
We will walk the graph for an agent you already run and show you the profile it produces — who can stop it, how fast, what it breaks, and the part that cannot be undone.