RiskMandate v1.34.4
The business case · Policy engine

Open Policy Agent, by the risk it changes

A general-purpose policy engine: an application or a proxy asks it whether a request is allowed and enforces the answer. Its documentation is explicit that it decides and does not enforce, so the case holds only where something the agent cannot bypass, such as an Envoy proxy, asks it and obeys. Written as answers, that is read-only access where the policy says so, and a log of every decision.

Open source: Apache-2.0 · CNCF (graduated) · get involved

The deployment: The model's typical deployment, with the answers this project addresses stated as they are without it: can read and change the data in its reach; what it did cannot be reconstructed.

The model: the RiskGraph Explorer's 49 facts, 49 risks and 10 roles, copied into this site with its provenance; the register below is computed, not written. How.

01 · What it does

In its own words, and nothing more.

  • Allow and deny decisions, enforced by a proxy such as Envoy. “Guests have read-only access to the /people endpoint, admins can create users too as long as the name is not the same as the admin's name.” · www.openpolicyagent.org, read 24 September 2026
  • Decision logs, one event per decision. “Each event includes the policy that was queried, the input to the query, bundle metadata, and other information that enables auditing and offline debugging of policy decisions.” · www.openpolicyagent.org, read 24 September 2026
02 · The answers it changes

Same deployment, different answers.

The model asks sixteen questions about an agent deployment. A product’s effect is written as the answers it changes, and each change says what kind of change it is: a statement of what is true, an expectation the agent is asked to meet, a setting, or a boundary enforced by something the agent’s grant does not include.

The questionWithout itWith itHow, and who holds it
What can it do with that data?Reads and changes itReads ita boundary, held by the deployer. Only for requests that pass through an enforcement point the agent cannot bypass, and only if the policy leaves writes out. “Guests have read-only access to the /people endpoint, admins can create users too as long as the name is not the same as the admin's name.” · www.openpolicyagent.org, read 24 September 2026
Could you reconstruct what it did last Tuesday?NoPartlya setting, held by the deployer. Partly: it records the decisions, not what the request then did. Drop rules can filter decisions out of the log. “Each event includes the policy that was queried, the input to the query, bundle metadata, and other information that enables auditing and offline debugging of policy decisions.” · www.openpolicyagent.org, read 24 September 2026
03 · The register, before and after

5 retired, 1 new, 22 unchanged.

Computed from the model for the deployment above: every risk that holds without it, and every risk that holds with it. A new entry is either one the change brought to light, where an answer replaced a don’t know, or a narrower risk in place of a wider one, where the answer moved from no to partly. Either way the register is more exact, and a register that grows because something was found is working.

5retired
1new
27 → 23entries on the register

Retired

RISK-13
What the agent did cannot be reconstructedoperational · SRE / platform on-call, CISO
RISK-16
Regulated data is modifiable by an agentoperational · CISO, DPO, Customer-facing service owner, Chief Product Officer
RISK-26
Records the organisation answers for can change without a person deciding they shouldoperational · Board
RISK-33
The organisation could not account for what its agent didoperational · Board
CORP-5
Accountability failure — the organisation cannot demonstrate who decided whatcorporate · CEO, Board

New

RISK-24
Only part of what the agent did can be reconstructedoperational · SRE / platform on-call
04 · From the operator to the board

Who carries less, and who carries the same.

Each risk is assigned to the roles it belongs to, and each role reports to another until the board. The count beside each role is the entries it holds without the product and with it.

Operators

who run it, and are paged when it goes wrong
SRE / platform on-call9 → 9retired RISK-13 · new RISK-24
Customer-facing service owner3 → 2 −1retired RISK-16

Owners

who own what it may touch, and can say what happened
Platform owner3 → 3
CISO10 → 8 −2retired RISK-13, RISK-16
DPO7 → 6 −1retired RISK-16

Executives

who answer for speed, product, cost and the whole
CTO3 → 3
Chief Product Officer5 → 4 −1retired RISK-16
CFO0 → 0
CEO4 → 3 −1retired CORP-5

The board

who must be able to defend how it is run
Board7 → 4 −3retired RISK-26, RISK-33, CORP-5

At the board: the corporate register

Corporate risks have no facts of their own. They hold while any risk that leads into them holds, so a single product rarely retires one. What it changes is how many reasons the board is being given.

CORP-1
Regulatory exposure — the organisation may be operating outside obligations it is subject tostill holds · risks leading into it: 4 before, 2 after
CORP-2
Customer harm — customers may be affected by decisions or changes nobody madestill holds · risks leading into it: 3 before, 2 after
CORP-3
Operational resilience — the organisation may be unable to restore a service it depends onstill holds · risks leading into it: 1 before, 1 after
CORP-5
Accountability failure — the organisation cannot demonstrate who decided whatretired · risks leading into it: 1 before, 0 after
CORP-6
Loss of control — the organisation operates a system it may not be able to stop or explainstill holds · risks leading into it: 2 before, 2 after
06 · What it adds

Every product is also a new thing in the estate.

It adds a decision point in the request path, and its decision logs store the request input. Whether it fails open is the enforcement point's choice: Envoy's external authorisation filter has a setting that accepts the request when the authorisation service fails, which defaults to false, and OPA's Envoy plugin has a dry-run mode that allows every request.

Free, but not free

What adopting it takes, before any of this is true.

An open-source project costs nothing to download and something to adopt. Every change above depends on the work below, and most of it is customisation to your own deployment.

  • Put the enforcement point where the agent cannot route around it, and keep the policy bundle out of the agent's grant.
  • Write the policy in Rego for your own resources, which is the customisation the whole case depends on.
  • Decide where decision logs go and how long they are kept.
Where its pages disagree

Published unresolved, for CNCF (graduated) to settle.

Each pair was read on the same day. We have not tested which is true, because that would mean testing somebody else’s system.

  • enforcement. The same documentation describes an engine that unifies policy enforcement across the stack, and says OPA decouples policy decision-making from policy enforcement. docs
What this does not claim

The limits of the case, stated by the case.

  • That OPA enforces anything by itself. Its own documentation says it decides.
  • That it was tested. Nothing was installed or run; every change rests on the documentation quoted beside it.
  • That the register is complete. It is one model, for one stated deployment. A different deployment changes the answers, and so the case.

Next. Published, and sent to the project's maintainers at the same time. If a change is wrong, or another answer should move, the case changes with the date they said so.

The same method, for your product

Make the case in the register’s own terms.

If you build a security product for agents, the case for it can be written the same way: what it does in your own words, the answers it changes, and the register before and after. If a case here is wrong about you, tell us and it changes with a date.